ARC's 1st Law: As a "progressive" online discussion grows longer, the probability of a nefarious reference to Karl Rove approaches one

Monday, April 17, 2006

I was for the war before I was against it before I was for it

ad infinitum...

If you're a Democrat or a journalist "inside the bubble" of New York or Washington, DC, the worst enemy to you and your career is conventional wisdom. While there may be much about CW that is "conventional," there's often less wisdom than one would expect or hope.

And, as Iraqi military documents are being translated, it seems that the conventional wisdom on Iraq (No WMDS! No Ties to Al Qaeda!) is slowly eroding away. Take this translated document, revealing that Saddam's underlings were destroying documentary evidence of WMD programs. Or this document about moving "special weapons" to Baghdad just before the US invasion in 2003:

[This document[ contains 9 pages TOP SECRET memo (pages 87-96 in the pdf document) dated March 16 2003 that talks about transferring “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” from one ammunition depot in Najaf to other ammunition depots near Baghdad. As we know by now the term SPECIAL AMMUNITION was used by Saddam Regime to designate CHEMICAL WEAPONS as another translated document has already shown. For example in document CMPC 2004-002219 where Saddam regime decided to use “CHEMICAL WEAPONS against the Kurds” they used the term “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” for chemical weapon. What is also interesting is that these “SPECIAL AMMUNITION” were listed as 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shells which are not by itself SPECIAL unless it contain CHEMICAL WEAPONS. In fact the Iraqi have always used 122 mm, 130 mm, and 155 mm caliber shell as a main delivery tool for Chemical Weapons Agents by filling these type of shells with Nerve Gas, Sarin, Racin, Mustard gas and other Chemical Agents.

Beginning of partial translation of Pages 85-96 in document ISGP-2003-0001498:
In the Name of God the Merciful The Compassionate
Top Secret

Ministry Of Defense

Chairmanship of the Army Staff
Al Mira Department
No. 4/17/ammunition/249

Date 16 March 2003

To: The Command of the Western Region

Subject: Transfer of Ammunitions

The secret and immediate letter of the Chairmanship of the Army Staff 4/17/308 on 10 March 2003

1. The approval of the Army Chief of Staff was obtained to transfer THE SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS in the ammunition depots group of Najaf and according to the following priorities:

A. The first priority
First. Ammunition (122 mm)
Second. Ammunition (130 mm)
Third. Ammunition (155 mm)

To the depots and storage of the Second Corp and the two ammunition depot groups Dijla/2/3

B. Second priority.
First. Ammunition (23 mm)
Second. Ammunition (14.5 mm)

To the ammunition depots of the air defense and distributed to the ammunition depot groups in (Al Mussayeb- Al Sobra- Saad).

2. To execute the order of the Chief Army Staff indicated in section (1) above, we relate the following:

A. Duty

Transfer of the ammunitions shown in sections (A) and (B) from the ammunitions depots of Najaf to the ammunition depots in (Dijla 2/3, and Al Mansor, and Saad, and Al Mussayeb, and Sobra and Blad Roz and Amar Weys from March 16 till April 14 2003.

General Rasheed Abdallah Sultan
Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff- Al Mira
March 2003

End of Partial translation
The remaining pages of this 9 pages top secret memo talk about getting the special vehicles to transfer the SPECIAL AMMUNITION and the people assigned to supervise and execute the transfer and they were top Iraqi Army and Military Intelligence officers.

JVeritas is translating through the tons of documents
over at FreeRepublic. Previous ARC posts are here, here, and here.

I guess the main question is... When you were for something before you were against it, is it more or less difficult to be for it again? Or, to put it in plain English, once you've flip-flopped, is it easy to flip again?

Your Co-Conspirator,
ARC: St Wendeler